

## Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY BERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 047812

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE SENT TO ISLAMABAD DTG R 120055Z MAR 76  
FM SECSTATE

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 047812

FOL REPEAT STATE 047812 SENT ACTION CAIRO LISBON  
MADRID MEXICO PARIS EROME TOKYO VALLETTA INFO  
BELGRADE BUCHAREST BUDAPEST HONG KONG MOSCOW  
PEKING PRAGUE SOFIA WARSAW FEB 27

QTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 047812

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 47812 ACTION CAIRO LISBON MADRID MEXICO  
PARIS ROME TOKYO VALLETTA INFO BELGRADE BUCHAREST BUDAPEST HONG  
KONG MOSCOW PEKING PRAGUE SOFIA WARSAW 27 FEB RPTD BAMAKO  
04 MAR

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 047812

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: UR, PINT, PFOR  
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SUBJECT: BREZHNEV'S FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT TO 25TH  
PARTY CONGRESS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF JOINT INR-EUR ASSESSMENT OF THE

FOREIGN POLICY PORTIONS OF BREZHNEV'S KEYNOTE SPEECH TO THE  
25TH PARTY CONGRESS ON FEBRUARY 24, 1976.

1. BEGIN TEXT. FOR THE MOST PART THE SPEECH CONFIRMS  
PREDICTIONS THAT FEW SURPRISES WERE IN THE MAKING.

(A)--THE ONLY INNOVATIONS OF SIGNIFICANCE ARE SLIGHT SHIFTS  
IN THE USSR'S POSITION ON INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES AND ARMS  
CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND A HARDER STANCE TOWARD  
EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES.

(B)--AS EXPECTED, BREZHNEV REAFFIRMED THE SOVIET UNION'S  
PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY COURSE, ALBEIT WITH LARGE DOSES OF  
CAUTION ABOUT DETENTE'S ENEMIES IN THE US, WESTERN EUROPE,  
AND CHINA; HIS TENOR WAS MORE SOBER THAN WAS THE CASE AT THE  
1971 CONGRESS.

(C)--THERE WERE NO NEW OR REVISED "PEACE PROGRAMS" OR OUT-  
LINES OF FUTURE GOALS.

BREZHNEV APPEARS INDEED TO HAVE DELIVERED A DEFENSIVE  
ACCOUNT OF HIS STEWARDSHIP AND IS LEAVING THE FUTURE TO  
OTHERS.

2. EMBASSY MOSCOW REPORTS THAT HIS PERFORMANCE IN THE  
FIVE-HOUR, TWO-BREAK SPEECH WAS THE BEST IT HAS SEEN IN  
THE PAST TWO YEARS AND THAT HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF A  
MAN IN GOOD HEALTH AND IN FULL COMMAND OF HIS MATERIAL.

3. US-SOVIET RELATIONS

4. IN HIS GENERALLY UPBEAT ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF US-  
SOVIET RELATIONS--THEIR "TURN FOR THE BETTER" UNDER THE  
NIXON AND FORD ADMINISTRATIONS "HAS, OF COURSE, BEEN  
DECISIVE" IN IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION--  
BREZHNEV PLACED THE BURDEN OF EXISTING PROBLEMS ON THE US  
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SIDE:

(A)--THE OPPONENTS OF DETENTE IN THE US WHO ARE USING AN  
IMAGINARY SOVIET THREAT TO JUSTIFY AN INTENSIFIED ARMS  
RACE;

(B)--US ATTEMPTS TO INTERFERE IN SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS  
THROUGH THE TRADE DISCRIMINATION/EMIGRATION ISSUE;

(C)--US INTERFERENCE ON THE SIDE OF OPPRESSION AND REACTION  
(AN APPARENT REFERENCE TO ANGOLA--ALTHOUGH ANGOLA WAS  
MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THIRD WORLD  
ISSUES), WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS OPPOSED AND WILL CON-  
TINUE TO OPPOSE.

5. AT THE SAME TIME, BREZHNEV TOOK NOTE OF THE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL EXCHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE UNDER THE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND PLEDGED FAITHFUL SOVIET IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS REACHED TO DATE, AS WELL AS CONTINUATION OF THE POLICY OF IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE US.

6. SALT

7. BREZHNEV'S REMARKS ON SALT WERE NOTEWORTHY PRIMARILY FOR THE FACT THAT HE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED FOR THE FIRST TIME THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO TRADE A BAN ON THE US TRIDENT SUBMARINE AND B-1 BOMBER FOR A BAN ON "SIMILAR SYSTEMS IN THE USSR." HE SAID MUCH THE SAME THING PRIVATELY TO THE HUMPHREY/SCOTT DELEGATION LAST JULY. BEYOND TAKING US TO TASK FOR NOT ACCEPTING THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH HE NOTED WERE STILL ON THE TABLE, BREZHNEV HAD NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE

TO SAY ABOUT SALT. HE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS AND THE DESIRABILITY OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT BASED ON VLADIVOSTOK, BUT THERE WAS NO REFERENCE TO RECENT PROGRESS NOR ANY PREDICTION OF SUCCESS IN THE FUTURE, WHICH REPRESENTS A STEP BACKWARD FROM THE OPTIMISTIC SOVIET OFFICIAL EVALUATION OF THE SECRETARY'S LAST MOSCOW TRIP.

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8. OTHER DISARMAMENT ISSUES

9. BREZHNEV'S DISCUSSION OF OTHER DISARMAMENT ISSUES TOOK THE FORM OF A PROGRESS REPORT ON ITEMS IN THE "PEACE PROGRAM" THAT HE LAID DOWN AT THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS IN 1971.

10. MBFR: BREZHNEV RECALLED THAT FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE HAD BEEN PART OF THE 1971 PARTY PROGRAM. HE BLAMED THE WEST FOR IMPEDING PROGRESS BY DEMANDING CONCESSIONS PREJUDICIAL TO THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. HE DESCRIBED THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 19 FOR REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES THIS YEAR AND FOR OTHER FORCES TO BE FROZEN. HE SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL INCLUDED REDUCTIONS OF TANKS, NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, AND MISSILE LAUNCHERS, ALONG WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THEM, BUT HE DID NOT REVEAL ANY FIGURES.

11. RENUNCIATION OF FORCE: BREZHNEV CALLED FOR A WORLD TREATY ON NON-USE OF FORCE AND NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS COMBINATION HAD BEEN IN THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION AT THE 1972 UNGA (IT IMPLIED THAT NUCLEAR RESPONSE TO CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION WOULD BE LEGITIMATE, AND THUS IMPLIED A WARNING TO PEKING AND AN EFFORT TO MEET TRADITIONAL

WESTERN OBJECTIONS TO RENUNCIATION OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS). THE NEW ELEMENT IN BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT WOULD APPEAR TO BE ONE OF FORM--THE USE OF A TREATY RATHER THAN A UN RESOLUTION.

12. INDIAN OCEAN: BREZHNEV DENIED THAT THE USSR INTENDS, OR EVER INTENDED, TO BUILD MILITARY BASES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN (IN EFFECT DENYING THAT THE USSR HAS A BASE AT BERBERA), AND CALLED UPON THE US TO ADOPT THIS SAME STAND.

13. WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE: RENEWING MOSCOW'S CALL FOR A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, BREZHNEV SAID THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO INVOLVE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION PROCESS. HE WARNED THAT THOSE WHO REFUSED WOULD BEAR A GRAVE RESPONSIBILITY. THE REMARK WAS PRESUMABLY DIRECTED AT CHINA IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, BUT IT WOULD APPLY TO FRANCE AND INDIA AS WELL.

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14. DETENTE AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

15. ALSO IN THE CONTEXT OF THE "PEACE PROGRAM" AND DETENTE, BREZHNEV DISMISSED AS INCOMPREHENSIBLE WESTERN FAILURE TO APPRECIATE CONTINUED SOVIET ADHERENCE TO SUPPORTING "OTHER PEOPLES' STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM AND PROGRESS." NOTING THAT DETENTE "PRIMARILY" MEANS THE AVOIDANCE OF WAR, THE USE OF FORCE, OR THREAT OF FORCE BETWEEN STATES BUT NOT THE ABOLITION OF THE LAWS OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE, BREZHNEV NOTED THAT:

(A)--COMMUNISTS WILL NEVER BECOME RECONCILED TO CAPITALIST EXPLOITATION IN CONDITIONS OF DETENTE.

(B)--DETENTE FURTHERS THE WAY FOR PEACEFUL SOCIALISM AND COMMUNIST CONSTRUCTION.

16. CASTING A BLOW AT LEFTIST CRITICS WHO CHARGED THAT DETENTE DENOTED PRESERVATION OF THE STATUS QUO, BREZHNEV DECLARED THAT EVERY REVOLUTION IS "PRIMARILY" THE NATURAL RESULT OF THE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIETY IN QUESTION. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE DETENTE ERA--AN APPARENT ALLUSION TO EVENTS IN PORTUGAL, GREECE, AND POSSIBLY SPAIN.

17. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

18. BREZHNEV SINGLED OUT THE RECENT GROWTH OF WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES, WHILE DEPRECATING THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THEM, WHICH HE SAID HAVE BEEN "SENSATIONALIZED" BY HOSTILE PROPAGANDA. HOWEVER, HE CAME DOWN HARD AGAINST THOSE (PRESUMABLY THE ITALIANS, FRENCH, SPANISH, AND

OTHERS) WHO ALLEGEDLY WERE APPROACHING PARTY ISSUES IN AN "UNPRINCIPLED" FASHION AND WITHOUT A SPIRIT OF "INTERNATIONALISM." HE PARTICULARLY NOTED THAT:

(A)--THERE COULD BE NO COMPROMISING ON MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE OR ACTIONS CONTRADICTING COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY.

(B)--SHORT-TERM ADVANTAGES REFLECTING AN OPPORTUNISTIC ATTITUDE COULD ONLY BRING HARM TO A PARTY IN THE LONGER CONFIDENTIAL

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RUN.

(C)--COMMUNIST COLLABORATION WITH SOCIALISTS AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATS SHOULD CONTINUE BUT NOT AT THE PRICE OF ANY IDEOLOGICAL RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO.

(D)--ANY RENUNCIATION OF "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM," WHICH SOME APPARENTLY NOW FIND IT FASHIONABLE TO REGARD

AS OBSOLETE, WOULD MEAN DEPRIVING COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT IN GENERAL OF A POWERFUL AND TESTED WEAPON. (HE MADE NO REFERENCE TO THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY'S REJECTION OF THE "DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT" DOCTRINE.) IN THIS CONTEXT, BREZHNEV REFERRED PARTICULARLY FAVORABLY TO THOSE REGIONAL CONFERENCES OF COMMUNIST PARTIES, NOTABLY THE ONE IN CUBA OF LAST SUMMER, WHICH HAVE ENDORSED THE SOVIET VERSION OF "INTERNATIONALISM."

19. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE LONG-STALLED EUROPEAN CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES WAS MENTIONED ONLY IN PASSING. BREZHNEV DID, HOWEVER, AGAIN ALLUDE TO THE IDEA OF A WORLD CONFERENCE, BUT HE WAS VAGUE ABOUT SCHEDULE OR FORMAT, MERELY LEAVING SUCH THINGS TO BE DECIDED BY "GENERAL AGREEMENT."

20. WESTERN EUROPE

21. BREZHNEV FOUND "CHANGES TOWARD DETENTE AND MORE SOLID PEACE...ESPECIALLY TANGIBLE" IN WESTERN EUROPE, BUT HE ALSO TOOK CAREFUL NOTE OF THE "NEGATIVE" DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION. HE RATED RELATIONS WITH WEST EUROPEAN STATES AS GOOD AND HOPED FOR THEIR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT. HOWEVER, HE ALSO:

(A)--TERMED CYPRUS A "COMPLEX AND DANGEROUS SOURCE OF TENSION";

(B)--FOUND RIGHTIST FORCES IN THE FRG STILL CLINGING TO REVANCHIST POSITIONS; AND

(C)--COMPLAINED THAT "SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS" IN THE

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1971 QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON BERLIN "ARE FAR FROM DOING EVERYTHING" TO RESPECT THE AGREEMENT; HE ADDED THAT "WE WILL INSIST ON A STRICT AND COMPLETE ADHERENCE TO ALL THAT HAS BEEN AGREED."

22. CONTRARY TO EARLIER EXPECTATIONS, CSCE DID NOT FORM THE CENTERPIECE OF BREZHNEV'S REMARKS ON EUROPE BUT ALMOST SEEMED TO BE TACKED ON AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT. HE MERELY NOTED THAT THE CSCE CODE OF PRINCIPLES ON STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS--SPECIFICALLY SINGLING OUT THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS PRINCIPLE--CREATED FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR "MAINTAINING AND CONSOLIDATING PEACE ON THE WHOLE CONTINENT."

23. BREZHNEV CONCLUDED SOBERLY THAT "MUCH PERSEVERING EFFORT" WOULD STILL BE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE "TRULY LASTING PEACE IN EUROPE AND TO MAKE DETENTE IRREVERSIBLE;"

24. MIDDLE EAST

25. BREZHNEV REITERATED THE STANDARD SOVIET CONTENTION THAT A LASTING SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST MUST GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF ALL STATES OF THE REGION AND THEIR RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE AND DEVELOPMENT. HE ALSO ATTACKED THOSE (UNNAMED) WHO, BY PURSUING "EGOISTIC AIMS" ARE TURNING THE NEAR EAST SETTLEMENT INTO A "POLITICAL GAME," USING THE "ESCALATION OF PARTIAL AGREEMENT" TO DELAY REAL DECISIONS OR TO CALL THEM INTO QUESTION.

26. HOWEVER, IN SPEAKING ABOUT MODALITIES FOR ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT BREZHNEV OTHERWISE TOOK A FLEXIBLE STANCE, FORECLOSING NO OPTIONS REGARDING THE FORM AND TIMING OF NEGOTIATIONS. HE:

(A)--REAFFIRMED THAT THE USSR "AS CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE" IS PREPARED TO COOPERATE IN "ALL EFFORTS TO REACH AN EFFECTIVE SETTLEMENT," ALTHOUGH IMPLICITLY INSISTING ON A GENEVA UMBRELLA FOR FURTHER TALKS;

(B)--RESTATED THE USSR'S WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF THE "SECURITY AND INVIOABIL2  
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ITY OF THE FRONTIERS OF ALL MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES," BUT SUGGESTED THAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE ALSO "COULD PARTICIPATE" IN SUCH GUARANTEES ALONG WITH THE USSR AND THE US; AND

(C)--ASSERTED THAT THE USSR IS READY TO TAKE PART "IN THE

SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE ISSUE OF STOPPING THE ARMS RACE IN THE REGION, BUT ONLY IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT." HOWEVER, BREZHNEV APPEARED TO BE RULING OUT ANY "SOLVING" OF THIS PROBLEM BEFORE A SETTLEMENT IS REACHED; SUCH A TIME SEQUENCE, HE CLAIMED, WOULD MEAN PUTTING THE AGGRESSOR AND HIS VICTIM ON THE SAME LEVEL. THE SOVIETS' PREVIOUS PUBLIC POSITION ON THE ARMS CONTROL ISSUE--FIRST ENUNCIATED BY KOSYGIN IN JUNE 1967--INSISTED THAT CONSIDERATION OF ARMS LIMITATIONS COULD ONLY FOLLOW ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967.

27. IN AN APPARENT REFERENCE TO ISRAEL, BREZHNEV ASSERTED THAT THE USSR FAVORS CREATION OF CONDITIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS WITH "ALL STATES" OF THE AREA. AND HE INSISTED THAT THE USSR HAS "NO PREJUDICE AGAINST ANY OF THEM," ALTHOUGH HE NOTED STRAINS IN SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS.

28. FAR EAST

29. ON THE QUESTION OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH PEKING, BREZHNEV WENT BEYOND MOSCOW'S STANDING OFFER TO NORMALIZE STATE RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" BY ADDING A BARBED IDEOLOGICAL OLIVE BRANCH: "IF PEKING REVERTS TO A POLICY TRULY BASED ON MARXISM-LENINISM, IF IT ABANDONS ITS HOSTILE POLICY TOWARD SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND TAKES THE ROAD OF COOPERATION AND SOLIDARITY WITH THE SOCIALIST WORLD, THERE WILL BE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE ON OUR SIDE."

30. BREZHNEV ONCE AGAIN EMPHASIZED THAT MAO'S POLICIES WERE "DIRECTLY HOSTILE" TO THE USSR AND DESCRIBED PEKING'S OPPOSITION TO DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT AS "FRANTIC." AT THE LAST CONGRESS, HE HAD CLAIMED TO SEE "SIGNS...OF A CERTAIN NORMALIZATION IN RELATIONS" BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.  
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TRIES; THERE WAS NO SUCH CLAIM ON THIS OCCASION AND THE "MATTER RESTS WITH THE CHINESE SIDE" FOR ANY IMPROVEMENT.

31. BREZHNEV DESCRIBED RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AS DEVELOPING IN A "POSITIVE DIRECTION," BUT, AS HE HAD AT THE 24TH CONGRESS, NOTED THAT "GROUNDLESS AND UNLAWFUL CLAIMS" TO THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES CONTINUED TO BE AN OBSTACLE TO CLOSER TIES. HE INDICATED THAT "DIRECT INCITEMENT" FROM PEKING WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE CLAIMS. ELSEWHERE, IN HIS GENERAL REMARKS ON ASIA, HE GAVE PRIDE OF PLACE TO INDIA. END OF TEXT.

32. ACTION ADDRESSEES MAY DRAW ON ABOVE ASSESSMENT, AS APPROPRIATE, IN CONVERSATIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT

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